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Constitutionalism, legitimacy, and public order:  
A South African case study 
 
 
Forthcoming in Constitutional Triumphs, Constitutional Disappointments (Rosalind Dixon and Theunis 
Roux, eds.) (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
 
 
Aziz Z. Huq, University of Chicago Law School 
 
 
 
Why do constitutions, or the broader political orders that coalesce around them, persist? 
One way to answer this question is to look at the institutional choices embedded in the text of the 
relevant organic document to see whether their designers were far-sighted or not. 1  Another 
approach is to ask whether they command the respect and loyalty of their citizenry. 2  Few 
constitutions persevere through sheer force of arms, violence, or terror. As Max Weber (2009 
[1922]) explained, the state—and hence the constitution upon which it rests—commonly relies on a 
reservoir of popular support for its basic institutions.3 In the absence of positive dispositions on the 
part of at least some substantial tranche of the people for some substantial part of the time, a state 
must make large expenditures on coercion, surveillance, and control. Political scientists, legal 
scholars, and social theorists operationalize this idea in terms of ‘legitimacy’.4 To be sure, the term 
‘legitimacy’ has been challenged for its vagueness and opacity.5 And it is always important to 
distinguish “sociological legitimacy” (my focus here) from moral and legal variants.6 But legitimacy 
remains a valuable tool for thinking about the preconditions of constitutional persistence.  
 
The central role of ‘sociological’ legitimacy in the maintenance of a constitution as a going 
concern raises a host of normative and empirical questions. What is the range of strategies for 
building reserves of popular support for a constitution—understood as both the specific document 
and the political order to which it is affiliated?.7 How do the specific conditions and circumstances 
of a given nation at a particular moment in time cabin the range of potential legitimating strategies? 
Constitutional legitimacy, that is, might be a highly contextual and path-dependent matter. An 
obvious pathway is mediated by a claim to democratic credentials. Alternatively, societies or political 
orders might be characterized by legitimation pathways that hinge on historical or religious 
predicates (or, as in the United States, some confabulation of the two). Yet others – consider here 
                                                
1 For example, Z. Elkins et al The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
2 T. Ginsburg and A. Huq ‘What can constitutions do? The Afghan case’ (2014) 25 Journal of Democracy 116–30. 
3 M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Routledge, 2009) 
4 B. Gilley, ‘The determinants of state legitimacy: results for 72 countries’ (2006) 27 International Political Science 
Review 47–71. 
5 X. Marquez,  ‘The Irrelevance of Legitimacy’ 2015 Political Studies. doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12202. It is also an 
open question whether surveillance technology will ultimately render legitimacy an outmoded technology of state 
consolidation.  
6 R. H. Fallon, ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1787–1853. 
7 B. Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy (New York City: Columbia University Press, 
2013) p. 5. 
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recent experience of China under communist rule after 1980 – might endorse a relentlessly 
consequentalist and welfarist criterion of legitimacy that is grounded on the promise of anticipated 
economic growth for most (if not all). Among these diverse strategies, empirical questions arise 
about how different pathways might interact to reinforce or undermine each other. And normative 
questions might arise as to whether certain strategies of legitimacy are preferable to others. It might 
be argued, for example, that a legitimating strategy that hinged on economic welfare while stifling 
democracy was intrinsically inferior to one that relied on free and fair elections. The opposite 
argument in favor of the post-Deng Xiaoping China model, of course, is also possible.  
 
This chapter considers an important, but rarely considered, question about constitutional 
legitimation: How might experiences with a particular kind of street-level bureaucrats8 influence the 
legitimacy of a constitutional regime?9 The post-apartheid experience of South Africa usefully 
illuminates the possibility that public experiences with policing – or rather the want of sufficient, 
effectual, and non-corrupt policing – can undermine trust in a government newly constituted under 
a constitution. Police are important precisely because they are dispersed, numerous, and localized 
representatives of the state. Members of the public are more likely to encounter police than judges, 
elected officials, or other state officials. Their view of the state, in consequence, may well be 
mediated by the behaviour of police. As a correlative, there is some evidence to suggest that 
experiences with the police provide important signals of relative standing, recognition, and dignitary 
worth to individuals.10 
 
The functions of police in conveying information about the competence and integrity of the 
state on the one hand, and in setting the terms of identification with the state on the other hand, 
suggest that scholars of constitutional legitimacy should attend closely not solely to macro pathways 
of constitutional legitimation, but also micro-level or retail dynamics. The persuasive hold of a 
constitution, that is, might depend not just on high-profile questions of national policy. It might also 
turn on the behavior of highly-dispersed officials, pursuing a range of state policies with high levels 
of discretion, and connected into the larger network of state institutions through loose and 
imperfectly-articulated nested sets of intrastate networks. This presents a significant question for 
constitutional designers: perhaps the harvest from their labors depends not on their choices, but the 
dispersed and hard-to-supervise decisions of a vast cadre of public officials at the front lines of 
contact with the public. Although a constitution can include some tools for regulating may-level 
bureaucracies, it seems likely that this control will be partial. As a result, a constitution will rise or fall 
on the integrity of state institutions with only partial linkages to the document and the main 
institutions of government created thereby. 
 
South Africa provides a useful lens to study this question. As I explain below in Part I, 
policing received careful attention in both the interim and permanent constitutions of the mid-
1990s. The assumptions animating these interventions, though, are at least up for debate. In Part II, 
I explore in some detail how policing and the production of public order have remained a pressing, 
                                                
8 M. Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 30th Ann. Ed.: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service (Russell Sage 
Foundation, 2010) 
9 There is a good deal of scholarship on the relationship between administration and constitutional regimes. My 
focus here, however, is on the discrete and different question of policing.   
10 B. Bradford et al., ‘Officers as Mirrors: Policing, Procedural Justice and the (Re)Production of Social Identity’ 
(2014) 54 British Journal of Criminology 527–50. 
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even intractable, problem for South Africans of all stripes. The realization of the ambitions of the 
1996 Constitution thus proved elusive, at least in regard to policing. Moreover, recent empirical 
studies suggest that this failure of the police to maintain public order is undermining the trust in the 
state. Micro encounters with police hence seemed to have macro effects in terms of judgments about 
the state as a whole. Part III then steps back and considers the possible consequences of this 
dynamic for constitutional design, given the effort by the South African constitutional drafters to 
influence the post-enactment path of policing. 
 
I.  Policing and the 1996 Constitution  
 
Criminality and private violence have presented tremendous policy challenges in South 
Africa under its 1996 Constitution. The Constitution itself speaks both to the organization and the 
practice of policing, albeit in inchoate and arguably ineffectual ways. Subsequent experience under 
the 1996 Constitution suggests that the mechanisms included in that document, in addition to 
subsequent statutes, have not oriented policing on the ground toward public-regarding ends. It is 
useful to begin, though, by attending to the text itself.  
 
South Africa is one of a handful of states to have had a system of racial hierarchy embodied 
in law – the apartheid regime established in 1948 and finally and definitively repudiated by the 
election of Nelson Mandela as president in 1994.11 The ensuing Constitution of 1996 was adopted in 
the context of a transition from apartheid rule that was accomplished without large defections from 
the police or other security services.12 Some changes to the national policing regime predated the 
Constitution. Until 1994, the South African Police Force had been organized into eleven homelands 
and tasked with maintaining a segregated polity.13 Police forces were further internally segregated, 
with ill-trained black officers called kitskonstabels tasked with policing townships.14 In 1995, the police 
force was centralized, the use of military ranks for officers was eliminated, and the ‘Force’ was 
renamed a ‘Service’. The Internal Security Act was also amended to constraint the police use of 
deadly force.15  
 
In the context of these sustained efforts to shift the role of security forces away from the 
promotion of racial stratification, it is hardly surprising that both the interim and the permanent 
Constitutions of the mid-1990s would address the pathologies of Apartheid-era police regulation. To 
begin with, the interim Constitution provided explicitly for community policing.16 Article 221 of that 
document envisaged ‘community-police forums’ that would promote the ‘accountability of the 
Service to local communities and co-operation of communities with the Service’ and evaluate ‘the 
provision of visible police services, including … the provision, siting and staffing of police stations 
                                                
11 W. Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
12 R. W. Johnson, South Africa’s Brave New World: The Beloved Country Since the End of Apartheid (London: 
Penguin Books, 2010). 
13 W. R. Pruitt, ‘The progress of democratic policing in post-apartheid South Africa’ (2010) 4(1) African Journal of 
Criminology & Justice Studies 116–140; M. Shaw, ‘Crime, police and public in transitional societies’ (2002) 49 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 1–24; M. Brogden, ‘Reforming police powers in South 
Africa’ (1994) 17(1) Police Studies 25–44. 
14 Pruitt, ‘The progress of democratic policing’ (n. 13). 
15 Ibid; Brogden ‘Reforming police powers’ (n. 13). 
16 M. Marks, C. Shearing and J. Wood, ‘Who should the police be? Finding a new narrative for community policing 
in South Africa’ (2009) 10(2) Police Practice and Research 145–155. 
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[and] … the reception and processing of complaints and charges’.17 Further, art. 222 stipulated an 
‘independent’ complaints body that would operate under some form of ‘civilian’ control.18 These 
shifts might be understood as efforts to make policing not only less racially segmented, but also as 
levers to dislodge inherited policing patterns of physical abuse and malign neglect. 
 
Both of these design choices reflect then-contemporary trends in policing. The former 
provisions reflect the influence of an international movement toward community-oriented policing 
that was emerging in Europe, America, and Australia in the 1980s and 1990s as a reaction against the 
more technocratic style of policing that had dominated since the 1950s.19 The core insight of 
community policing strategies is that police and communities are ‘coproducers’ of security against 
crime; this basic intuition can be executed in a wide range of different kinds of police-community 
interaction.20 At the same time that community policing was coming into vogue, various forms of 
‘independent’ review authority were being adopted, such as civilian complaint review processes and 
auditors.21  
 
Both design choices, furthermore, entailed literal transplantations of concepts and 
institutional forms from other national contexts in ways that are open to question. For example, the 
English scholar Michael Brogden has forcefully argued that the ‘community policing’ model rests on 
assumptions about social structure and governance capacity that simply do not hold in contexts such 
as South Africa’s, where the level of available bureaucratic capacity may not have equaled that of 
Britain or the United States.22 Similarly, it is far from clear that ‘independent’ review authorities are a 
panacea for police wrongdoing. Although internal investigatory processes can suffer from pro-police 
bias, they might also benefit from better access to information to determine when potential 
wrongdoing occurs, and what, in fact, happened. By contrast, independent bodies often depend on 
police for this information. Further, whereas internal processes are often staffed by police officers 
with experience with forensics and investigative techniques, there is no guarantee that such expertise 
can be recruited for an external agency. The choice between internal and external accountability 
mechanisms in the policing context, in short, presents a difficult trade-off between information and 
impartiality. Depending on the context and the available resources, the trade-off may be best 
resolved in quite different ways.  
  
The 1996 Constitution, like its interim precursors, speaks directly to the core aims and the 
structural organization of policing. In comparison to its interim precursor, it retreats from the 
community-focused interim document, but preserves the idea of an independent police review 
power. As in the interim Constitution, there is a specific section solely focused on policing. In 
section 205 of the 1996 Constitution, the ‘objects of the police service’ are characterized in anodyne 
and general terms: ‘to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect 
                                                
17 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1993, art. 221. 
18 Ibid, art. 222. 
19 W. G. Skogan and S. M. Hartnett, Community Policing, Chicago Style (Oxford University Press, 1997); H. 
Goldstein, ‘Toward community-oriented policing: potential, basic requirements, and threshold questions’ 1987 (33) 
Crime & Delinquency 6–30. 
20 J. H. Skolnick and D. H. Bayley, ‘Theme and variation in community policing’ (1988) 10 Crime and Justice 1–37. 
21 S. E. Walker and V. W. Bumphus, ‘The effectiveness of civilian review: observations on recent trends and new 
issues regarding the civilian review of the police’ (1992) 11(1) American Journal of Police. 
22 M. Brogden, ‘Implanting community policing in South Africa: a failure of history, of context, and of theory’ 
(2004) 24(3) Liverpool Law Review 157–179. 
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and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law’. 
Unlike section 221 of the interim Constitution, these general terms provide no direction as to the 
nature of the relationship between the police and the public, or any obligations in respect to 
procedural justice, community policing, or distributional equity. Indeed, it is possible to read the 
1996 Constitution’s Article 205 as a volte-face from interim iteration’s section 221: where the latter 
stressed the organic relationship between the police and the population they serve, the former 
identifies abstract, technocratic objectives that sound in a more authoritarian ‘law and order’ register 
than their precursors.  
 
Yet the commitment to community-oriented policing did not vanish. In a 1998 White Paper 
published by the Ministry of Safety and Security, the new government identified the creation of a 
‘legitimate police service’ as a central goal of organizational and legal changes to policing.23 That 
paper envisaged ‘a partnership between the police and communities’ to deliver effective security 
(quoted in Minnaar 2009: 28).24 That is, what had previously been installed at a constitutional level 
was sublimated into sub-legislative governmental policy. This shift, it should be noted, raises the 
interesting question whether street-level policing might have been rendered more effective by a 
constitutional commitment to community policing. Absent far more evidence, testing this 
counterfactual is difficult.   
 
Like the interim Constitution, the 1996 Constitution also speaks to questions of institutional 
structure and accountability within the police force. In section 206, political responsibility for a 
national policing strategy is shared between a cabinet-level official and provincial governments. It is 
striking that the most substantive constraint upon policing policy reflects a concern with provincial 
power, rather than individual or community-level interests, insofar as national policy must account 
for ‘the policing needs and priorities of the provinces as determined by the provincial executives’.25 
Section 207 envisages a national police commissioner with a level of managerial responsibility for 
implementing the national policing strategy. The constitutional text is not clear as to whether this 
official is supposed to have supervisory and corrective responsibility for lapses in the legality or 
efficacy of policing. Nor is it clear that the office is vested with power to remedy such lapses. 
 
Further, section 206(7) states that an ‘independent police complaints body established by 
national legislation must investigate any alleged misconduct of, or offence committed by, a member 
of the police service in the province’. In addition to reflecting international trends in police reform, 
installation of independent police review could be usefully understood in light of the rise of 
constitutionalized ombudsman institutions in the 1990s and 2000s focused on human rights or 
corruption matters (Reif 2011). Like an ombudsman, an independent police review authority at least 
seems to promise a neutral (if not necessarily well-informed) perspective on governmental 
malfeasance. It is yet another effort to create a neutral, legalistic space within the state for realization 
of rights free from short-term political hydraulics.  
                                                
23 Shaw, ‘Crime, police and public in transitional societies’ (n. 13) at 29. 
24 Quoted in A. Minnaar, ‘Community policing in a high crime transitional state: the case of South Africa since 
democratization in 1994’ in D. Wisler, I. D. Onwidiwe (eds.) Community Policing: International Patterns and 
Comparative Perspectives (London: CRC Press, 2009) at p. 28. For details of the White Paper’s context, see A. 
Minnaar, ‘The Changing Face of ‘Community Policing’ in South African post-1994’ (2010) 2 Acta Criminologica 
189-210. 
25 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s. 206. 
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Finally, although not explicitly tethered to policing, elements of the Bill of Rights further 
speak to how police are envisaged as operating. Section 12 contains a commitment to the “free[dom] 
from all forms of violence from either public or private sources.” Section 14 protects privacy from 
searches and seizures in absolute terms, but is modified by the general limitations language of 
section 36. The latter permits constraints that are ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors elsewhere in the Constitution’. The parallelism with (and divergence from) the U.S. Fourth 
Amendment is striking. Like its South African counterpart, the United States (U.S.) provision does 
not protect against all searches and seizures, but only those that are ‘unreasonable’. Unlike the South 
African document, the U.S. Constitution directs its energies at the margin to the regulation not of 
executive-branch officers, but of judges. It imposes constraints on when and how (presumptively 
judicial) warrants for searches and arrests can be issued. In practical effect, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has often exploited the ambiguous term ‘unreasonable’ as a means to facilitate police discretion, but 
rarely as a way to account for ‘human dignity, equality and freedom’.26  
 
Calibrating the measure of appropriate police force in general terms presents a difficult 
problem. Police routinely exercise force in order to limit or restrain private violence. The more 
effective police are in this task, studies suggest, the less likely citizens are to endorse the extralegal 
use of force.27 Hence, there is a trade-off in some instances between the police’s use of force and the 
quantum of private violence. By lumping these two kinds of violence together, section 12 leaves it 
unclear how the trade-off will be resolved. It is not clear the generic language of section 36 provides 
more precise guidance. Just like the vaguer language of the U.S. Constitution, the South African 
approach thus leaves crucial questions unresolved even at a fairly general level of abstraction.  
 
II. Policing and public order in the post-apartheid state  
 
A. Crime and policing under the 1996 Constitution  
 
The aspirations of the 1996 Constitution in respect to policing and crime have not been 
vindicated. South Africa remains deeply afflicted by crime. Recorded crime rose after the 
establishment of democratic government, and, despite a reduction in some categories of violent 
crime over the last decade, other forms of offending have increased. House robbery, for example, 
almost doubled between 2002/03 and 2009/10, while business robbery increased 2.6 times over the 
same period. In 2011, in a nation of about 49 million inhabitants approximately 50 murders, 100 
rapes, 400 armed burglaries and 500 violent assaults were reported each day. 28 To put this in 
perspective, South Africa’s murder rate in 2011 was about 7.9 times that of the United States. Even 
as crime, violence and insecurity have become pervasive features of post-apartheid life, neither the 
African National Congress’s (ANC) efforts to maintain social order against crime or to reorient the 
South African Police Service (SAPS) prevailed. Rather, policing has continued to be pervasively 
shaped by the historical legacy and contemporaneous effects of racial, economic, and geographic 
                                                
26 A. Z. Huq, ‘Judicial independence and the rationing of constitutional remedies’ (2015) 65(1) Duke Law Journal 
1–80. 
27 J. Jackson et al ‘Monopolizing force? Police legitimacy and public attitudes toward the acceptability of violence’ 
2013 19(4) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 479–497. 
28 ‘Kill and be killed’ (27 August 2011) The Economist, (available at www.economist.com/node/21526932). 
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stratification.29 It has both reflected and shaped sharp economic and racial divides. Whether or not a 
different constitutional design might have yielded different outcomes, therefore, it is clear that the 
actually adopted constitutional design of post-apartheid policing resulted in national-level policy 
failure.  
 
Violent crime became a major national issue for the ANC in the late 1990s as the flush of 
transformative change started to recede.30 A very early government response took the form of a 
National Crime Prevention Strategy. This proved to be ‘stillborn’ and hence ineffectual.31 Post-
apartheid governments instead instigated organizational change policies that have purported to aim 
toward a generally pro-active, community policing model. 32  For example, the police were 
rechristened the South African Police Service. This organization folded together the police, and the 
police forces of the former homeland—seemingly intently focused on a community-oriented form 
of security.  
 
But the reality has been quite different. Government and police have uniformly over-
promised and under-performed in regard to what can be ‘delivered’. 33  The SAPS has been 
continuously presented as the answer to crime, and there have been repeated attempts to import the 
latest crime control models from Anglo-American police departments and academics.34 ‘Crime-talk’35 
remains pervasive in the public sphere, revolving perennially around the failure of police and the 
state to protect citizens from violent crime. In response, the state promoted its own effectiveness in 
combating crime throughout the post-Apartheid period. This discourse persisted even as overall 
crime rates rose, but has continued as those rates have fallen. This discourse ultimately led to the re-
emergence of paramilitary style policing around the year 2000 that culminated in 2009 with President 
Zuma insisting the police were a ‘force’, not a ‘service’,36 a shift in language justified by an alleged 
need to communicate to criminals that the state was not soft on crime. 
 
Through this period, police increasingly relied upon apartheid-era policing modalities in 
townships, in particular ‘high density, high mobility, paramilitary policing’.37 As Mark Shaw rightly 
emphasizes, it is those who are poor and black who are most likely to be victims of this approach 
(Shaw 2002: 14-15).38 In contrast, the policing of urban business districts has been aimed at 
                                                
29 T. Leggett, ‘Performance measures for the South African police service: setting the benchmarks for service 
delivery’ (2002) 49 Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 55–85. 
30 J. Steinberg, ‘Security and disappointment: policing, freedom and xenophobia in South Africa’ (2011) 51(5) 
British Journal of Criminology 1–16; J. Steinberg, ‘Crime prevention goes abroad: policy transfer and policing in 
post-apartheid South Africa’ (2011) 15(4) Theoretical Criminology 349–364; A. M. Singh, Policing and Crime 
Control in Post-apartheid South Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008); Leggett ‘Performance measures’ (n. 29). 
31 Steinberg, ‘Security and disappointment’ (n. 30) at 5. 
32 Ibid; J. Steinberg ‘Establishing police authority and civilian compliance in post-apartheid Johannesburg: an 
argument from the work of Egon Bittner’ (2012) 22(4) Policing and Society 481–495. 
33 Leggett, ‘Performance measures’ (n. 29). 
34 Steinberg, ‘Crime prevention goes abroad’ (n. 30); D. H. Baylay, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic 
Police Abroad (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
35 T. Sassoon, Crime Talk: How Citizens Construct a Social Problem (New York: Aldine de Gruyter: 1995). 
36 Leggett, ‘Performance measures’ (n. 29); J. Steinberg Thin Blue (Capetown : Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2008); 
Steinberg ‘Crime prevention’ (n. 30). 
37 Steinberg, ‘Security and disappointment’ (n. 29) at 9.  
38 Shaw, ‘Crime, police and public in transitional societies’ (n. 13). 
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preserving the exclusion of black township residents from those areas.39 The bifurcation of policing 
strategies has exacerbated geographic segregation by race and income.  
 
As a result of the durability of an ‘old’ policing culture, police relations with black urban 
populations in particular have remained characterized by the same ‘strong mutual defiance’ that had 
been observed during the late apartheid era (Fourchard 2011: 252).40 Police efficacy has suffered as a 
result. Police morale also remains fragile. Using a narrative form, Jonny Steinberg vividly recounts 
the fragility of police command of space in township areas, and the weakness of the formal 
institutions of policing.41 Within the SAPS, he shows, morale remains low. This is perhaps not 
surprising, since South Africa has one of the highest rates of police deaths in the world.42  
 
Many people in South Africa report difficult relationships with the police. These negative 
views seem to result from extremely negative experiences of police activity. In particular, the police’s 
relations with young men from the townships are often tense.43 So, too, is their relationship with 
immigrants and particularly undocumented foreigners, 44  or rape victims and other vulnerable 
groups.45 As in any policing context, if people feel unfairly targeted, or that they are not receiving the 
level of service they deserve when they report a crime, then the legitimacy of the police will likely 
suffer. In contrast to this evidence, Kynoch reports perceptions that SAPS officers are more 
approachable and respectful than their apartheid predecessors and that people expect the police to 
serve all citizens rather than narrow sectional interests.46 That study is probably best read to suggest 
that South Africans may at least be open to positive experiences of encounters with police given the 
marginal improvement in policing since the early 1990s. 
 
 These problems are compounded by a long-standing problem of corruption. This 
undermines attempts at legitimating the South African police. Police malpractice has been a major 
concern in recent years as high-profile scandals reached the very top of the SAPS, including the 
suspension, replacement and conviction of former national commissioner Jackie Selebi due to 
alleged involvement in organized crime, and the suspension of his successor, Bheki Cele, in October 
                                                
39 T. R. Samara, ‘Order and security in the city: producing race and policing neoliberal spaces in South Africa’ 
(2010) 33(4) Ethnic and Racial Studies 637–655. 
40 L. Fourchard, ‘The politics of mobilization for security in South African township’ (2011) 110 (440) African 
Affairs 246–268 at 252; Steinberg, ‘Security and disappointment’ (n. 30); Steinberg, ‘Crime prevention goes abroad’ 
(n. 30); Steinberg, Thin Blue (n. 36). 
41 Steinberg, Thin Blue (n. 36). 
42 D. Singh ‘Violators and victims: a historical review of policing in South Africa after a decade of democracy’ 
(2004) 17(3) Acta Criminologica 86–98. 
43 M. Marks, Transforming the Robocops: Changing Police in South Africa (Durban: University Of KwaZulu-Natal 
Press, 2005). 
44 A. Mosselson, ‘“There is no difference between citizens and non-citizens anymore”: Violent xenophobia, 
citizenship and the politics of belonging in post-apartheid South Africa’ (2010) 36(3) Journal of Southern African 
Studies 641–655; M. Neocosmos, ‘The politics of fear and the fear of politics: reflections on xenophobic violence in 
South Africa’ (2008) 43 Journal of Asian and African Studies 586–94. 
45 R. Morrell et al, ‘Hegemonic masculinity/masculinities in South Africa: culture, power, and gender politics’ 
(2012) 15(1) Men and Masculinities 11–30.: 10.1177/1097184X12438001; L. Vetten, ‘Paradox and policy: 
addressing rape in post-apartheid South Africa’ in N. Westmarland and G. Gangoli (eds.) In International 
Approaches to Rape (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2011). 
46 G. Kynoch, ‘Apartheid nostalgia: personal security concerns in South African townships’ (2003) 5 South African 
Crime Quarterly 7–10. 
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2011 based on corruption allegations. These problems appear to reach right down through the 
organization.47 It is no surprise that there is an entrenched public perception that the SAPS is 
corrupt.  
 
Policing does not merely reflect South Africa’s internal conflicts. It also reproduces and 
deepens them. Efforts to make the SAPS more diverse and inclusive have faltered, leading to limited 
changes to police-community relations. In a 2008 ethnography of the Durban police, Monique 
Marks found that ‘despite affirmative action and equity legislation and programs, Durban[’s police 
force] was still plagued by deep racial and gender divisions’.48 Women and blacks, rather than being 
welcomed, were marginalized by ‘police managers who are steeped in old ways’. Even to the limited 
extent that the police have become more racially diverse, police recruited from townships quickly 
cease to be identified as in-group members by those they police. As Steinberg (2012: 352) explains, 
upwardly mobile police officers move to suburbs, ‘diving into a very deep pool of expensive private 
services and a lifetime of debt’ scorned by the subjects of their policing.49  
 
Relatedly, the salience of crime as an issue in South Africa and the social divisions fostered 
by extreme inequality and the legacy of apartheid have, along with other factors, catalyzed alarming 
displays of xenophobia. ‘Foreigners’, usually immigrants from other Sub-Saharan African countries, 
but also internal migrants, are blamed by some for many social ills, including crime.50 The legitimacy 
of the police may, again, be caught up in the social strain that produces and is reproduced by this 
xenophobia.51 Yet the effect of rising xenophobia on public judgments about the police is likely to 
be complex. Steinberg notes that anger toward immigrant groups was encouraged by state practices 
as the government attempted to maintain its bond with the poor. But their negative views are often 
motivated by anger at the perceived failure of the police to deal with immigrants’ purported 
criminality.52 
 
The failure of policing reform cannot be explained without attending to the deep, and 
widening, socio-economic rifts within South African society. South Africa is characterized by high 
economic inequality in comparison to other countries. According to the United Nations 
Development Program, it has a Gini co-efficient of 57.8.53 Alongside Brazil, this makes it one of the 
most economically unequal societies in the world. Economic inequality, moreover, tracks racial 
divisions. Apartheid policies ensued that racial divides would translate into economic inequalities. 
Apartheid ‘systematically and brutally’ entrenched economic inequality along racial lines. 54 
Unsurprisingly, by the fall of the apartheid, income, employment, and education were distributed in 
sharply uneven fashion between South Africa’s generally recognized racial groups (blacks, whites, 
                                                
47 J. Burger ‘To protect and serve: restoring public confidence in the SAPS’ (2011) 36 South African Crime 
Quarterly 13–22. 
48 M. Marks, ‘Looking different, acting different: struggles for equality within the South African police service’ 
(2008) 86(3) Public Administration 643–658 at 646. 
49 Steinberg, ‘Security and disappointment’ (n. 30) at 351. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Mosselson, ‘There is no difference’ (n. 44). 
52 Steinberg, ‘Security and disappointment’ (n. 30), at 354-56. 
53 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2010 - 20th Anniversary Edition: The Real 
Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development (Geneva: United Nations, 2010). 
54 J. Seeking and N. Nattras, Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005) 
at p. 2. 
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coloured, and Indians).55 Racial and economic divisions in South Africa also have a geographic 
dimension that influences how police are deployed. Samara,56 has argued that urban centers, and in 
particular, business improvement districts, have been developed in ways that preserve the 
segregation of black townships from highly developed white urban areas. In his study of policing in 
Cape Town, he emphasizes how private and public security is deployed to prevent the ‘spillover of 
violence’ from the largely poor black townships of Cape Flats into the highly developed urban 
center (Samara 2008: 204).57 
 
A collateral effect of economic inequality is the temptation for the wealthy to ‘opt out’ of the 
state system of social order maintenance through the purchase of private security and for the 
impoverished to turn to vigilante organizations.58 The private security sector has grown rapidly since 
the 1990s, fed in part by defections from the post-apartheid SAPS.59 Private and public policing 
functions, however, are not cleanly separated, but characterized by a ‘growing interpenetration and 
overlap’.60 Indeed, Marks and Wood present evidence that private security can interact directly with 
community policing initiatives and thereby serve as a ‘more responsive and reliable’ substitute for 
the SAPS.61 As a result of these trends, the provision of security is no longer exclusively (or even 
centrally) associated with the state as opposed to private networks defined by solidarity group, 
residence, or economic class. 62  Samara has demonstrated that the resulting proliferation of 
geographically-sorted private policing produces a racial social ordering that tightly restricts the 
mobility of the urban black poor.63  
 
In contrast, some less wealthy South Africans have turned to vigilante organizations to 
replace absent policing.64 Again, the resulting structures are not always easy to cleanly separate from 
official state structures. Fourchard argues that grassroots vigilante organizations are hard to separate 
from formal structures established through community policing initiatives from the late 1990s 
onward.65  
 
The experience of poor South Africans with the SAPS, finally, cannot be untangled from the 
difficulties encountered by the post-Apartheid state. Failure to address backlogs in the provision and 
maintenance of basic services may further erode police legitimacy. Put bluntly, when people do not 
                                                
55 L. Thompson, A History of South Africa, (New Haven: Yale University Press: 2001) at pp. 299–230. 
56 Samara, ‘Order and security in the city’ (n. 39); T. R. Samara, ‘Policing development: urban renewal as neo-
liberal security strategy’ (2008) 47(1) Urban Studies 197–214.  
57 Samara, ‘Policing development’ (n. 58) at 204; 
58 M. Marks, and J. Wood, ‘South African policing at a crossroads: the case for a ‘minimal’ and ‘minimalist’ public 
police’ (2010) 14(3) Theoretical Criminology 311–329; Samara, ‘Order and security in the city’ (n. 39); Shaw, 
‘Crime, police and public in transitional societies’ (n. 13); B. Baker,  ‘Living with non-state policing in South 
Africa: the issues and dilemmas’ (2002) 40(1) Journal of Modern African Studies 29–53. 
59 Pruitt, ‘The progress of democratic policing’ (n. 13). 
60 Baker, ‘Living with non-state policing’ (n. 58) at 33. 
61 Marks and Wood, ‘South African policing’ (n. 58) at 318. 
62 Singh, Policing and Crime Control, (n. 30). 
63 Samara, ‘Order and security in the city’ (n. 39). 
64 B. Bearak, ‘Constant Fear and Mob Rule in South African Slum’, The New York Times (30 June 2009); R. 
Abrahamson and M. C. Williams, ‘Public/private, global/local: the changing contours of Africa’s security 
governance’ (2008) 35(118) Review of African Political Economy 547–553.  
65 Fourchard, ‘The politics of mobilization’ (n. 40). See also, Steinberg, ‘Security and disappointment’ (n. 30); 
Samara, ‘Policing development’ (n. 56). 
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have running water, or are forced to use unenclosed ‘street toilets,’ their sense that any state agency 
can legitimately represent their interests may be undermined. There have been large protests in 
recent years due to dissatisfaction with household service provision, access and quality. The police – 
especially Public Order Police (POP) units – have played a key role in monitoring and quelling these 
mass actions, and there have been a number of instances of police brutality, the most notable being 
the killing of Andries Tatane, a protester in Ficksburg in Free State province in early 2011. Such 
events may have strengthened the public’s perception of an association between policing and failures 
in service provision.  
 
b. The failure of policing and constitutional legitimacy  
 
The 1996 Constitution implied a promise of sound policing. The post-apartheid state has 
thus far failed to deliver on that promise. But has this had any effect on the Constitution’s 
legitimacy? Some evidence to that effect derives from a 2013 study conducted by a group of four 
criminal-justice researchers (including myself).66 That study drew on data from the 2010 South 
African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), an annual national survey of 3183 South African adults 
aged 16 years and over conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). As 
relevant here, the survey focused on how experiences with the police—in particular perceptions of 
the police’s efficacy and fairness—influenced normative judgments about not only the police, but 
also the state more generally. Our study did not ask about the Constitution. Nevertheless, it is 
plausible to think that our findings about normative judgments about the post-apartheid state have 
some correlation with normative judgments about the post-apartheid constitution.  
 
A core finding of this study was that the legitimacy of the state was strongly correlated with 
the polity’s experience of the police. Micro-level negative interactions with specific officers, in other 
words, translated into a macro-level effect of state delegitimation. Citizens attended not only to the 
effectiveness of the police when forming their legitimacy judgments in regard to the state, but also to 
the fairness of their actions (e.g., whether they acted with respect and impartiality, allowed 
individuals’ to voice their perspective, etc.). Consistent with a body of research that shows the 
importance of ‘procedural justice’ in policing,67 the results suggested that citizen’s concerns about 
crime should not be acted on at the expense of efforts to improve the more affective aspects of the 
relationship between police and public. Correlatively, the study also found evidence that perceptions 
of broader state failure influenced judgments about the police. That is, when the government’s 
trustworthiness and performance is in doubt, the legitimacy of the police also suffers. Perceptions of 
the policing function and of the state writ large were entangled. Police legitimacy is a vital element of 
the wider legitimacy of any democratic state, and the failure of a police force to deliver security in an 
efficient and fair manner can undermine the broader normative mandate of the state.  
 
Experiences with police might have powerful effects on normative judgments of state’s 
legitimacy for a number of reasons. Two are worth highlighting here. First, the police are at the front 
lines of contact with the public. Police are especially likely to be present (or conspicuously absent) in 
                                                
66 B. Bradford et al, ‘What price fairness when security is at stake? Police legitimacy in South Africa’ (2013) 8(2) 
Regulation and Governance 246–268. 
67 T. R. Tyler ‘Legitimacy and legitimating’ (2006) 57 Annual Review of Psychology 375–400; T. R. Tyler, Why 
People Obey the Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2006); T. R. Tyler, ‘Policing in black and white: ethnic 
group differences in trust and confidence in the police’ (2005) 8 Policing Quarterly 322–324. 
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stressful and emotionally charged situations such as the Marikana massacre of late September 2012. 
Hence, it is likely that judgments about the overall competence and fairness of the state writ large 
will be often inferred from experience with the state writ small, i.e., the police. Second, although 
relatedly, experiences with the police, and in particular perceptions of how the police treats the 
citizen, help form a sense of shared social identity and, correlatively, a sense of the citizen’s relative 
standing as a citizen. As a result, policing has an ‘expressive’ effect.68 
 
As the criminologist Ben Bradford has argued based on studies of the United Kingdom and 
Australia, experiences of fairness at the hands of authority figures, such as police officers, has 
positive effects on trust, legitimacy and people’s compliance-related behaviors, because such 
experiences strengthen their connections to the social groups those authorities represent, promoting 
allegiance to group norms and values (Bradford 2012;).69 Bradford suggests that people are sensitive 
to signs and symbols that communicate information about their status and position within a group, 
and that police treatment has an especially powerful communicative effect in this regard. His 
research finds that people evaluate police behavior in terms of its identity-relevant content, in 
particular, the message it conveys about membership in the nation. Policing – whether the failure to 
provide security or the unwillingness to treat individuals with dignity and respect—sends a strong 
message that an individual is not a coequal member of the polity. For the wealthy, it signals that the 
state is unable to supply your basic needs. Such messages, in turn, seem to have consequences for 
the legitimacy of the state. By extension, it is quite plausible to think that deterioration of moral 
support influences public views on the Constitution too.  
 
In sum, there is good reason to think that micro-level interactions with police have an effect 
on macro-level normative beliefs about the state and the Constitution. A person whose daily 
experience of the state is its failure to provide basic security against crime and violence, who then 
finds the police to be corrupt and violent themselves, is not likely to have a positive view of other 
state institutions. The leap of inference I am offering here – one that ought to be treated as a 
hypothesis warranting further research rather than a solid conclusion – is to claim that this distrust 
of the state will leak into judgments about the Constitution upon which the state rests as a matter of 
law. In this way, the Constitution can be undermined as a legitimate instrument of government by 
the dispersed and only partially controlled actions of its street-level agents.  
 
III. Theorizing the role of public order in constitutional legitimation  
 
 The South African experience suggests that policing and the problem of public order can 
play a role in the legitimation or delegitimation of a new constitutional order. This dynamic 
illustrates the possibility of linkages between the micro-level experiences of the state and macro-level 
effects of legitimacy and stability. It thus illuminates one of the pathways that may connect the mass 
of the public with relatively abstract constitutional dynamics. In this regard, it illuminates one 
                                                
68 J. Jackson, and B. Bradford, ‘Crime, Policing and Social Order: On the Expressive Nature of Public Confidence in 
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modality of what might be called popular constitutionalism,70 albeit not only consciously or directly 
focused on the text or substance of the constitution itself. This Part steps back by developing a 
tentative account of when and how such popular constitutional effects might be observed, and what 
implications for constitutional survival.  
 
As a threshold matter, it is important to point out that state legitimation effects are not 
contingent on a constitutional reference to policing. Even if the 1996 South African Constitution 
had said not a word about policing or public order, the efficacy and fairness of individual officers 
could still have had an effect upon state and constitutional legitimacy. A constitution might thus 
founder due to omissions, or because it speaks to policing and public order in a suboptimal fashion. 
Similar effects have been found in a wide range of other national contexts, from the United States71 
to Ghana, 72  without regard to constitutional commitments to public order. The promise of 
maintaining an effectual monopoly on violence, per Weber, may well be so ingrained in 
understandings of what a state is that constituting documents do not need to spell this out in order to 
create public expectations.  
 
At the same time, the South African experience shows that a state’s failure to supply public 
order may not prove fatal (in the sense of precipitating constitutional change) or even debilitating to 
the continued operation of a constitutional order. A state may rely on plural sources of legitimation. 
These might include a historical claim to be an authentic voice of the ‘people.’ This may be a claim 
with special potency in the South Africa for blacks at least. Until recently, the ANC had an effectual 
monopoly on political power. In August 2016, however, the party experienced an unprecedented 
string of electoral defeats at the municipal level, including in important cities such as Pretoria, where 
blacks make up three-quarters of the population.73 A large question for the future stability of the 
South African constitutional order, therefore, may be whether a new class of political leaders can 
identify alternative pathways to state legitimacy even as the institutional apparatus of the state 
(including the police) are likely to remain highly corrupt and incompetent, so as to limit the delivery 
of effectual services. Different political parties have taken different positions in respect to this 
question, with the Democratic Alliance striving most clearly to position itself as the party of delivery 
rather than the custodian of a national, democratic revolution. Other states with similarly deficient 
systems for service delivery have resorted to quite different legitimation strategies, and continue to 
survive (if not prosper in any conventional way) by focusing on the promise of external threats. The 
current North Korean and Iranian regimes provide useful examples in this regard.  
 
A selective failure to supply public order, moreover, may be unjust but also remarkably 
stable. In the United States, for example, local and state police have a long history of both 
withholding effectual protection and also imposing supernumerary coercion on racial minorities. 
One consequence is that for racial minorities in the U.S. today, contact of any form with the criminal 
justice system tends to be politically enervating in the sense that it is associated with lower levels of 
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political and civil engagement a trend that is likely to worsen with time.74 The result is a stable 
negative feedback loop: negative encounters with police reinforce minorities’ sense that they are not 
coequal citizens, which in turn leads them to give up on voting and other forms of civic engagement. 
Their disengagement in turn diminishes the chances of meaningful reform of policing emerging 
from the political process. A stable constitutional order, the American experience shows, can coexist 
with persistent racial (or social) stratification of a deeply iniquitous sort.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The post-apartheid state’s failure to deliver on constitutional promises of public order and 
effectual security is an important determinant of state and constitutional legitimacy, even if it does 
not fatally undermine the prospects for the 1996 Constitution’s continued survival. On a more 
general, theoretical level, the dynamics illuminated here illustrate the connection between macro-
level dynamics of constitutional legitimacy with micro-level interactions occurring between 
individual citizens and street-level agents of the state. This micro/macro connection suggests that 
constitutional survival should be conceptualized as a problem of ordinary politics and 
administration, as much as a question of high theory and normative principle.  
] 
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